This paper specifies how to do policy simulations with alternative instrument-rate paths in DSGE models such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main model for policy analysis and forecasting. The new element is that these alternative instrument-rate paths are anticipated by the private sector. Such simulations correspond to situations where the Riksbank transparently announces that it plans to implement a particular instrument-rate path and where this announcement is believed by the private sector. Previous methods have instead implemented alternative instrument-rate paths by adding unanticipated shocks to an instrument rule, as in the method of modest interventions by Leeper and Zha (2003) . This corresponds to a very different situation where the Riksbank would nontransparently and secretly plan to implement deviations from an announced instrument rule. In actual simulations, such deviations are normally both serially correlated and large, which seems inconsistent with the assumption that they would remain unanticipated by the private sector. Simulations with anticipated instrument-rate paths seem more relevant for the transparent flexible inflation targeting that the Riksbank conducts. We provide an algorithm for the computation of policy simulations with arbitrary restrictions on nominal and real instrument-rate paths for an arbitrary number of periods after which a given policy rule, including targeting rules and explicit, implicit, or forecast-based instrument rules is implemented. When inflation projections are sufficiently sensitive to the real interest-rate path, restrictions on real interest-rate paths provide more intuitive and robust results, whereas restrictions on nominal interest-rate path may provide somewhat counter-intuitive results.
Introduction
This paper specifies how to do policy simulations with alternative instrument-rate paths in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main DSGE model. 1 The new element is that these alternative instrument-rate paths are anticipated by the private sector. Such simulations correspond to situations where the central bank transparently announces that it plans to implement a particular instrument-rate path and where this announced plan for the instrument rate is believed by the private sector. Previous methods have instead implemented alternative instrument-rate paths by adding unanticipated shocks to an instrument rule, as in the method of modest interventions by Leeper and Zha [14] (see appendix A). That method is designed to deal with policy simulations that involve "modest" unanticipated deviations from a policy rule. It corresponds to a very different situation when the central bank would nontransparently and secretly plan to surprise the private sector by deviations from an announced instrument rule. Aside from corresponding to very non-transparent policy, such deviations are in practical simulations usually both serially correlated and large, which seems inconsistent with the assumption that they would remain unanticipated by the private sector. In other words, they are in practice not "modest" in the sense of Leeper and Zha. Simulations with anticipated instrument-rate paths seem more relevant for the transparent flexible inflation targeting that central banks such as the Riksbank conduct.
The main purpose with policy simulations with alternative instrument-rate paths is to provide the policymaker with a set of policy choices and to illustrate how the development of the economy would differ for different policy choices. Doing alternative policy simulations by optimal policy simulations for alternative weights on target variables in the loss function has the advantage that the different alternatives are efficient, for instance, in the sense that further stabilization of the inflation projection around the inflation target cannot be achieved without allowing more fluctuations in the projection of the output gap.
In this paper we instead show how to do alternative policy simulations in a different way, namely by satisfying arbitrary restrictions on the nominal or real instrument rate by adding an anticipated sequence of constants to a general but constant policy rule, including targeting rules (conditions on target variables) and explicit or implicit instrument rules (instrument rules where the instrument rate depends on predetermined variables only or also forward-looking variables). By applying a special case of the more general analysis of judgment in Svensson [23] , this can be done in a very simple way by treating the vector of such constants as an additional predetermined variable. This allows the model to be written in the standard state-space form and the use of standard solution methods. This very conveniently allows policy simulations for alternative arbitrary nominal and real instrument-rate paths, whether or not these are optimal for a particular reasonable loss function or not. We also provide, in an appendix, an alternative somewhat more complicated algorithm for arbitrary time-varying policy rules. 2 We consider policy simulations where restrictions on the nominal or real instrument-rate path are eventually followed by an anticipated future switch to a given well-behaved policy rule, either optimal or arbitrary. With such a setup, there is a unique equilibrium for each specified set of restrictions on the nominal or real instrument-rate path. The equilibrium will, in a model with forward-looking variables, depend on which future policy rule is implemented, but for any given such policy rule, the equilibrium is unique. It is well known since Sargent and Wallace [19] that an exogenous nominal instrument-rate path will normally lead to indeterminacy in a model with forward-looking variables (and to an explosive development in a model with backward-looking model), so at some future time the nominal instrument-rate must become endogenous for a wellbehaved equilibrium to result (see also Gagnon and Henderson [11] ). Such a setup with a switch to a well-behaved policy rule solves the problem with multiple equilibria for alternative instrumentrate projections that Gali [12] has emphasized. On the other hand, consistent with Gali's results, the unique equilibrium depends on and is sensitive to both the time of the switch and the policy rule to which policy shifts.
In describing the optimal policy choice, we find it practical to describe it as the selection of an optimal policy projection of the instrument rate and the target variables from the set of feasible policy projections, the set of projections of the instrument rate and the target variables that satisfy the projection model of the economy. Since the parameters of the projection model are interpreted as structural parameters and the projection of the instrument-rate path is anticipated by the private sector, the description is not subject to the Lucas [16] critique. Thus, the optimal policy projection is the feasible projection that minimizes the intertemporal loss function that represents the objectives of monetary policy. Although this policy choice is formally equivalent to the choice of an optimal instrument rule, we find the above description of the optimal policy choice closer to the 2 Linear rational-expectations models with anticipated arbitrary instrument-rate paths implemented via anticipated time-varying intercepts gives rise to systems of linear difference equations that are analogous to those with stochastic disturbances with arbitrary time-varying nonzero means. As explained in Svensson [25] , these can also be solved with several alternative algorithms, including the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore [7] - [10] , the Gensys algorithm of Sims [20] , and the generalizatio of the Klein [13] algorithm of Svensson [23] . The algorithm used here is arguably especially convenient, though.
actual choice situation of a monetary-policy committee such as the Riksbank's Executive Board.
Riksbank Board members see graphs of alternative policy projections to choose from. They don't see a set of alternative instrument rules to choose from. In particular, they don't see an explicit representation of an optimal instrument rule. Indeed, an optimal instrument rule implicitly takes into account all information that has an impact on the forecast of the target variables, including judgment, which makes it more or less infeasible to write it down.
The set of feasible policy projections has an infinite number of elements. The methods to construct alternative policy projections discussed in this paper can be seen as restricting the policy choice to a finite number of relevant alternative policy projections.
We show our results for three different models, namely the small empirical backward-looking model of the U.S. economy of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] , the small empirical forward-looking model of the U.S. economy of Lindé [15] , and Ramses, the medium-sized model of the Swedish economy of Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani [4] . 3 From the analysis in this paper, we conclude that, in a model without forward-looking variables, such as the Rudebusch-Svensson model, there is no difference between policy simulations with anticipated and unanticipated restrictions on the instrument-rate path. In a model with forward-looking variables, such as the Lindé model or Ramses, there is such a difference, and the impact of anticipated restrictions would generally be larger than that of unanticipated restrictions. In a model with forward-looking variables, exogenous restrictions on the instrument-rate path are consistent with a unique equilibrium, if there is a switch to a well-behaved policy rule in the future. For given restrictions on the instrument-rate path, the equilibrium depends on that policy rule.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that, if inflation is sufficiently sensitive to the real instrument rate, "unusual" equilibria may result from restrictions on the nominal instrument rate. Such cases have the property that a shift up of the real interest-rate path reduces inflation and inflationexpectations so much that the nominal interest-rate path (which by the Fisher equation equals the real interest-rate path plus the path of inflation expectations) shifts down. Then, a shift up of the nominal interest-rate path requires an equilibrium where the path of inflation and inflation expectations shifts up more and the real instrument-rate path shifts down. In the RudebuschSvensson model, which has no forward-looking variables, inflation is so sluggish and insensitive to changes in the real instrument rate that there are only small differences between restrictions on the nominal and real instrument rate. In the Lindé model, inflation is so sensitive to the real 3 See also Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani [5] and [6] . instrument rate that restrictions for 5-6 quarters or more on the nominal instrument rate result in unusual equilibria. In Ramses, unusual equilibrium seems to require restrictions for 11 quarters or more.
Because of the possibility of unusual equilibria for restrictions on nominal instrument rates, restrictions on the real rather than nominal instrument rate are preferable since they lead to more robust and intuitive results. Also, it makes sense to impose restrictions on and consider shifts of the real instrument-rate path rather than the nominal one, since the real interest rates rather than nominal ones are what matter for real activity and for inflation. In general, given the possibility of unusual equilibria, it may in many cases be preferable to instead generate alternative instrumentrate projections as optimal policy projections that minimize an intertemporal loss function for alternative weights on the target variables. Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson [1] (ALLS1) show how to do optimal policy simulations in Ramses, that is, simulations of policy that minimizes an intertemporal loss function under commitment. 4 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the state-space representation of a linear(ized) DSGE model, section 3 describes the projection model. Section 4 describes the optimal policy choice, and in particular emphasizes that the real-world policy problem for monetary-policy makers can be seen as selecting an optimal projection in a set of feasible projections, rather than as selecting a particular instrument rule (although it will be equivalent to choosing an optimal instrument rule, but that instrument rule is in practice too complex to be made explicit). Section 5 specifies optimal projections. Some of the material of sections 2 and 5 is discussed in more detail in ALLS1. Section 6 shows how to do policy simulations with an arbitrary constant (that is, time-invariant) policy rule, such as an instrument rule or a targeting rule. Section 7 shows a very simple way of doing policy simulations that satisfy arbitrary time-varying restrictions on the real or nominal instrument rate by introducing anticipated time-varying constants in the policy rule.
These sections also highlight the difference between models with forward-looking variables such as Ramses and the Lindé models and previous models without forward-looking variables such as the Rudebusch-Svensson model. Section 8 provides examples of restrictions on nominal and real instrument-rate paths for the Rudebusch-Svensson model, the Lindé model, and Ramses. These examples also highlight the difference between restrictions on the nominal and the real instrument- 4 The intertemporal loss function is a discounted sum of expected future period losses. The period loss is a quadratic loss function that corresponds to flexible inflation targeting and is the weighted sum of three terms: the squared inflation gap between inflation and the inflation target, the squared output gap between output and potential output, and the squared quarterly change in the Riksbank's instrument rate, the repo rate. Alternative optimal policy simulations can be done by changing the weights and arguments in the loss function. rate paths. These differences are important when inflation projections and inflation expectations are sensitive to changes in the real instrument-rate paths. Section 9 presents some conclusions. 
The model
A linear model with forward-looking variables can be written in the following practical state-space form,
Here,   is an   -vector of predetermined variables in period  (where the period is a quarter);   is an   -vector of forward-looking variables;   is generally an   -vector of (policy) instruments but in the cases examined here it is a scalar, the instrument rate, in the Riksbank's case the repo rate,
shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix   ; , , and , and  are matrices of the appropriate dimension; and  + | denotes E   + for any variable   , the rational expectation of  + conditional on information available in period . The forward-looking variables and the instruments are the nonpredetermined variables. 5 The variables can be measured as differences from steady-state values, in which case their unconditional means are zero. Alternatively, one of the components of   can be unity, so as to allow the variables to have nonzero means. The elements of the matrices , , , and  are estimated with Bayesian methods and considered fixed and known for the policy simulations. Hence the conditions for certainty equivalence are satisfied.
The upper block of (2.1) provides   equations determining the   -vector  +1 in period  + 1
where  and  are partitioned conformably with   and   as
The lower block provides   equations determining   in period  for given  +1| ,   , and
We hence assume that the   ×   submatrix  22 is nonsingular. 6 Let   be an   -vector of target variables, measured as the difference from an   -vector  * of target levels. This is not restrictive, as long as we keep the target levels time invariant. If we would like to examine the consequences of different target levels, we can instead interpret   as the absolute level of the target levels and replace   by   −  * everywhere below. We assume that the target variables can be written as a linear function of the predetermined, forward-looking, and instrument variables,
where  is an   × (  +   +   ) matrix and partitioned conformably with   ,   , and   . For plotting and other purposes, and to avoid unnecessary separate program code, it is convenient to expand the vector   to include a number of variables of interest that are not necessary target variables or potential target variables. These will then have zero weight in the loss function.
Let the intertemporal loss function in period  be
where 0    1 is a discount factor,   is the period loss given by
and  is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix containing the weights on the individual target variables.
In a backward-looking model, that is, a model without forward-looking variables, there is no vector   of forward-looking variables, no lower block of equations in (2.1), and the vector of target variables   only depends on the vector of predetermined variables   and the (vector of)
3. The projection model and the feasible set of projections
denote a projection in period  for any vector of variables   , where  + denotes the mean forecast of the realization of the vector in period  +  conditional on information available in period . We refer to  as the horizon of the forecast  + . The projection model for the projections (           ) in period  uses that the projection of the zero-mean i.i.d. shocks is zero,  + = 0 for  ≥ 1. It can then be written as
for  ≥ 0, where
where  | is the estimate of predetermined variables in period  conditional on information available in the beginning of period . Thus, " " and "|" in subindices refer to projections (forecasting) and estimates ("nowcasting" and "backcasting") in the beginning of period , respectively. The feasible set of projections for given  | , denoted T ( | ), is the set of projections that satisfy (3.1)-(3.3).
We call T  ( | ) the set of feasible projections in period . It is conditional on the estimates of the matrices , , and  and the estimate of the current realization of the predetermined variables
In a backward-looking model, there are no forward-looking variables in the projection model.
Optimal policy choice
The policy problem in period  is to determine the optimal projection in period . The optimal projection is the projection (        ) that minimizes the intertemporal loss function,
where the period loss,  + , is specified as
for  ≥ 0. The minimization is subject to the projection being in the feasible set of projections for
When the policy problem is formulated in terms of projections, we can allow 0   ≤ 1, since the above infinite sum will normally converge also for  = 1. The optimization is done under commitment in a timeless perspective (Woodford [27] ).
The intertemporal loss function (4.1) with the period loss function (4.2) introduces a preference ordering over projections of the target variables,   . We can express this preference ordering as the modified intertemporal loss function,
where the modification is the added term
In that term, Ξ −1 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the equations for the forward-looking variables from the optimization problem in period  − 1,   is the projection of the vector of forward-looking variables in period  that satisfies the projection model (3.1) and the initial condition (3.3), and  −1 is the optimal projection in period  − 1 of the vector of forward-looking variables in period  ( −1 is predetermined in period  and normalizes the added term and makes it zero in case the projection   coincides with the projection  −1 but does not affect the choice of optimal policy). As discussed in Svensson and Woodford [26] , the added term and the dependence on the Lagrange multiplier Ξ −1 ensure that the minimization of (4.3), under either discretion or commitment, results in the optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective. 7 The optimal policy choice, which results in the optimal policy projection, can now be formulized as choosing   in the set of feasible projections in period  so as to minimize the modified intertemporal loss function, that is, to solve the problem
The set of feasible projections T  ( | ) is obviously very large and contains infinitely many different policy projections. The construction of alternative policy projections with alternative anticipated instrument-rate paths described in this paper can be seen as an attempt to narrow down the set of infinite alternative feasible policy projections to a finite number of alternatives for the policymaker to choose between.
For a given linear projection model and a given modified quadratic intertemporal loss function, it is possible to compute the optimal policy projection exactly. By varying the parameters of the modified intertemporal loss function it is possible to generate alternative policy projections. Generating alternative policy projections in that way has the advantage that the policy projections are efficient in a specific sense. However, the policymaker may still prefer to see a few representative 
for  ≥ 0. The special case is when the forward-looking variables in the vector   only include current or expected future inflation rates and/or current or expected future output gaps. Then the added term,
3), only implies that the concentric ellipses need not necessarily be centered at the origin, which corresponds to the inflation projection and the outputgap projection both equal to zero. Iso-loss curves further out correspond to higher losses. The optimal policy projection, (    −  ), is given by the tangency point between the set of feasible projection and an iso-loss curve. This is where the intertemporal loss (4.3) is minimized on the set of feasible projections. 8 
Optimal policy projections
The optimization results in a set of first-order conditions, which combined with the model equations (2.1) results in a system of difference equations (see Söderlind [21] and Svensson [24] ). The system of difference equations can be solved with several alternative algorithms, for instance, those developed by Klein [13] and Sims [20] (see Svensson [23] and [24] for details of the derivation and the application of the Klein algorithm). 9 Under the assumption of optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective, the optimal projection can be described by the following difference equation,
for  ≥ 0, where  =  | . The Klein algorithm returns the matrices   ,   , and  . The submatrix   in (5.1) represents the optimal instrument rule,
These matrices depend on , , , ,  , and , but they are independent of . That they are independent of  demonstrates the certainty equivalence of optimal projections (the certainty equivalence that holds when the model is linear, the loss function is quadratic, and the shocks and the uncertainty are additive); only probability means of current and future variables are needed to determine optimal policy and the optimal projection. The   -vector Ξ + consists of the Lagrange multipliers of the lower block of (3.1), the block determining the projection of the forward-looking variables. The initial value for Ξ −1 is discussed in ALLS1. 10 Alternative optimal projections can be constructed by varying the weights in the matrix  and the discount factor . Using alternative optimal projections has the advantage that the projections considered are efficient in the sense of minimizing an intertemporal loss function. That is, each projection is such that it is not possible to reduce the discounted sum of squared future projected deviations of a target variable from its target level without increasing the discounted sum of squared such future projected deviations of another target variable. In figure 4 .1, the efficient subset of the set of feasible projections is given by the positively sloped line that is the boundary of the set of feasible projections. There are obvious advantages to restricting policy choices to be among efficient alternatives. Projections constructed with an arbitrary instrument rule (or with arbitrary deviations from an optimal instrument rule) are generally not efficient in this sense. That is, they correspond to points in the interior of the feasible set of projections, points north-west of the positively sloped line in figure 4.1.
In a backward-looking model, there are no forward-looking variables   , and in an optimal projection of a backward-looking variable, there are no Lagrange multipliers Ξ  . 10 The optimal projection can also be described as
where the and Φ are matrices returned by the AIM algorithm and partitioned conformably with  Ξ−1  and .(The notation Φ· refers to the larger sub matrix [Φ ΦΞ Φ Φ]; Φ is the leftmost submatrix of this submatrix.) Here,  | − −1 denotes the difference between the estimate  | , which is based on information available in the beginning of period , and the projection −1 , which is based on the information available in the beginning of period  − 1.
Projections with a constant arbitrary instrument rule
With a constant (that is, time-invariant) arbitrary instrument rule, the instrument rate satisfies
is a given (linear) instrument rule and partitioned conformably with   and   . If   ≡ 0, the instrument rule is an explicit instrument rule; if   6 = 0, the instrument rule is an implicit instrument rule. In the latter case, the instrument rule is actually an equilibrium condition, in the sense that in a real-time analogue the instrument rate in period  and the forward-looking variables in period  would be simultaneously determined.
The instrument rule that is estimated for Ramses is of the form (see the appendix of ALLS1
for the notation)
where   ≡  (the notation for the short nominal interest rate in Ramses). Since   and  , the deviation of CPI inflation and output from trend, are forward-looking variables in Ramses, this is an implicit instrument rule.
An arbitrary more general (linear) policy rule (  ) can be written as
is partitioned conformably with   and   and the
is partitioned conformably with   ,   , and   . This general policy rules includes explicit, implicit, and forecast-based instrument rules (in the latter the instrument rate depends on expectations of future forward-looking variables,  +1| ) as well as targeting rules (conditions on current or expected future target variables). 11 When this general policy rule is an instrument rule, we require the   ×   matrix   to be nonsingular, so (6.3)
The optimal instrument rule under commitment can be written on the form
11 A targeting rule can be expressed in terms of expected leads, current values, and lags of the target variables; see Svensson [22] and Svensson and Woodford [26] .
where the matrix   in (5.3) is partitioned conformably with   and Ξ −1 . Here the   -vector of Lagrange multipliers Ξ  in equilibrium follows
where the matrices  in (5.2) has been portioned conformably with   , and Ξ −1 . Thus, in order to include this optimal instrument rule in the set of policy rules (6.3) considered, the predetermined variables need to be augmented with Ξ −1 and the equations for the predetermined variables with (6.5). For simplicity, the treatment below does not include this augmentation. Alternatively, below the vector of predetermined variables could consistently be augmented with the vector of Lagrange multipliers, so everywhere we would have
The general policy rule can be added to the model equations (2.1) to form the new system to be solved. With the notation  ≡ ( 0    0  ) 0 , the new system can be written
where is partitioned conformably with   and   and is partitioned conformably with   ,   , and   . The corresponding projection model can then be written
Then, under the assumption that the policy rule gives rise to the saddlepoint property (that the number eigenvalues with modulus greater than unity is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables) there exist matrices  and  such that the resulting equilibrium projection satisfies
for  ≥ 0, where the matrices  and  depend on and, and thereby on , , , , and  . 12 In a backward-looking model, the time-invariant instrument rule depends on the vector of predetermined variables only, since there are no forward-looking variables, and the vector  is identical to   .
Projections with time-varying restrictions on the instrument rate
Consider a restriction on the instrument-rate projection of the form
where { + }   =0 is a sequence of  + 1 given instrument-rate levels. Alternatively, we can have restriction on the real instrument-rate projection of the form
where
is the real instrument rate and  +1| is expected inflation. With restrictions of this kind, the nominal or real instrument rate is exogenous for period 0 1   .
These restrictions are anticipated by both the central bank and the private sector, in contrast to
Leeper and Zha [14] where they are anticipated and planned by the central bank but not anticipated by the private sector. Thus, the current case corresponds to a situation where the restriction is announced to the private sector by the central bank and believed by the private sector, whereas the Leeper and Zha case corresponds to a situation where the central bank either makes secret plans to implement the restriction or the restriction is announced but not believed by the private sector.
The restrictions are followed by an anticipated switch in period  + 1 to the policy rule (  ) in order to guarantee determinacy. The restrictions can be implemented by adding time-varying 12 Equivalently, the resulting equilibrium projection satisfies 
constants to the policy rule (  ),
where the sequence of scalars { + }   =0 is chosen such that (7.1) or (7.2) is satisfied. More precisely, we let the ( + 1)-vector   ≡ (    +1    + ) 0 denote a projection of the stochastic process { + }   =0 of the stochastic variable  + . The stochastic variable   is called the deviation, as in the treatment of central-bank judgment in Svensson [23] . In particular, we assume that the deviation satisfies Then we have
It follows that the dynamics of the deviation can be written
where the ( + 1) × ( + 1) matrix   is defined as
Hence,   is the central bank's mean projection of current and future deviations, and   can be interpreted as the new information the central bank receives in the beginning of period  about those deviations. 13 Let us now combine the projection model, (3.1), with the restriction (7.4) and the dynamics of the deviation, (7.5). We can then write the combined projection model as
 + +1¸=
• +  +¸( 7.6) 13 In Svensson [23] the deviation  is an -vector of terms entering the different equations in the model, and the projection   of future  deviation is identified with central-bank judgment. The graphs in Svensson [23] can be seen as impulse responses to   , the new information about future deviations. (The notation here is slightly different from Svensson [23] in that there the projection   does not include the current deviation.)
for  ≥ 0, where
Under the assumption of the saddlepoint property, the system of difference equations (7.6) has a unique solution and there exist unique matrices  and  such that the solution can be writteñ
is given but the ( +1)-vector   remains to be determined. Its elements are then determined by the restrictions (7.1) or (7.2).
In order to satisfy the restriction (7.1) on the nominal instrument rate, we note that it can now be written
This provides  + 1 linear equations for the  + 1 elements of   .
In order to instead satisfy the restriction (7.2) on the real instrument rate, we note that inflation expectations in a DSGE model similar to Ramses generally satisfy
for some vectors  and Φ. For instance, if   is one of the elements of   , the corresponding element of  is unity, all other elements of  are zero, and Φ ≡ 0. If  +1| is one of the elements of  , the corresponding element of Φ is unity, all other elements of Φ are zero, and  ≡ 0. 14 Then the restriction (7.2) can be written
This again provides  + 1 linear equations for the  + 1 elements of   .
14 Note that  and Φ here are structural, not reduced-form expressions.
Backward-looking model
In a backward-looking model, the projection of the instrument rule with the time-varying constraints can be written
so it is trivial to determine the projection   recursively so as to satisfy the restriction (7.1) on the nominal instrument-rate projection. Inflation can be written
for some vector Φ, so expected inflation can be written
By combining (7.8), (7.9) and (7.3), it is trivial to determine the projection   so as to satisfy the restriction (7.2) on the real instrument-rate projection.
Examples
In this section we examine restrictions on the nominal and real instrument-rate path for the backward-looking Rudebusch-Svensson model and the two forward-looking models, the Lindé model and Ramses. Appendices C provide some details on the Rudebusch-Svensson and Lindé models.
We also show a simulation with Ramses with the method of modest interventions by Leeper and Zha. Appendix A provides some details on the Leeper-Zha method.
The Rudebusch-Svensson model
The backward-looking empirical Rudebusch-Svensson model [18] has two equations (with estimates rounded to two decimal points)
The period is a quarter, and   is quarterly GDP inflation measured in percentage points at an annual rate,   is the output gap measured in percentage points, and   is the quarterly average of the federal-funds rate, measured in percentage points at an annual rate. All variables are measured as differences from their means, their steady-state levels. The predetermined variables are
The target variables are inflation, the output gap, and the first-difference of the federal funds rate. The period loss function is
where   is measured as the difference from the inflation target, which is equal to the steady-state level. The discount factor, , and the relative weights on the output-gap stabilization,   , and interest-rate smoothing,  ∆ , are set to satisfy  = 1,   = 1, and  ∆ = 02.
For the loss function (8.3) with the parameters  = 1,   = 1, and  ∆ = 02, and the case where   is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean, the optimal instrument rule is (the coefficients are rounded to two decimal points) real instrument rate also reduces the output gap. In the Rudebusch-Svensson model, inflation is very sluggish and the output gap responds more to the nominal and real instrument rate than inflation. From quarter 6, there is no restriction on the instrument-rate path, and according to both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule, the nominal and real instrument rate are reduced substantially so as to bring the negative inflation and output gap eventually back to zero. The optimal policy is more effective in bringing back inflation and the output gap than the Taylor rule, which is natural since the Taylor rule is not optimal.
The middle column shows projections when the real instrument rate is restricted to equal unity during quarters 0-5. Since there is so little movement in inflation and expected inflation, the projections for these restrictions on the real and the nominal instrument rate are very similar.
Since there are no forward-looking variables in the Rudebusch-Svensson model, there would be no difference between these projections with anticipated restrictions on the instrument-rate path and simulations with unanticipated shocks as in Leeper and Zha [14] .
The Lindé model
The empirical New Keynesian model of the US economy due to Lindé [15] also has two equations.
We use the following parameter estimates,
The period is a quarter, and   is quarterly GDP inflation measured in percentage points at an annual rate,   is the output gap measured in percentage points, and   is the quarterly average of the federal-funds rate, measured in percentage points at an annual rate. All variables are measured We also examine the projections for a Taylor rule for which the instrument rate responds to the forward-looking current inflation and output, when there is a restriction to equal unity for quarters 0-3 for the real instrument rate (middle column) and the nominal instrument rate (right column). In the middle column, the restriction on the real instrument rate reduces inflation quite a bit, and the corresponding nominal instrumentrate projection is quite a bit below unity and the real instrument rate for quarters 0-3, but still positive. In line with this, in the right column, the restriction on the nominal instrument rate to nominal and the real instrument rate. Also, from quarter 4, when there is no restriction on the instrument rate, a fall in the real and nominal real instrument rate, according to both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule, more easily stabilizes inflation and the output gap back to the steady state than in the Rudebusch-Svensson model.
In figure 8.3 , we extend the restrictions on the nominal and real instrument rate another quarter, to quarter 4. If we look at the panel in the bottom row, middle column, for the Taylor rule and the restriction on the real instrument rate, we see that the shift up of the real instrument rate during quarters 0-5 now shifts the inflation projection and inflation expectations down so much that the corresponding nominal instrument-rate projection becomes negative. If we nevertheless in the bottom right panel insist on shifting up the nominal instrument-rate path and restricting the nominal instrument rate to become positive and equal to unity for quarters 0-4, we see that there is then no equilibrium with a positive real instrument rate and lower inflation during quarters 0-4.
Instead, there is a very different equilibrium with high inflation and a negative real interest-rate during quarters 0-4. Thus, imposing a restriction on the nominal instrument rate this way gives way to a very different equilibrium than we first might have expected.
As we can see in the top row in figure 8.3 , this phenomenon does not happen under the optimal policy. There, the restriction on the nominal instrument-rate to equal unity for quarters 0-4 is consistent with a higher real instrument rate and a lower, but not too low, inflation rate. The difference between these projections in the right column of the figure is of course because expectations of optimal policy from quarter 5 rather than the Taylor rule implies more stability in inflation before quarter 5.
In figure 8.4 , we extend the restrictions to six quarters, quarters 0-5. Then we see that the phenomenon of high inflation and low real instrument rate for the restrictions on the nominal instrument rate (right column) occurs for both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule.
We see from these examples that high sensitivity of the inflation projection and inflation expectations to changes in the real instrument rate may cause unusual equilibria when restrictions on the nominal instrument rate is imposed for sufficiently many quarters. Our conclusion is that it is more robust to impose restrictions on the real instrument rate. Also, this makes sense from the point of view that it is real interest rates that matter for output and inflation.
Ramses
The appendix of ALLS1 provides more details on Ramses, including the elements of the vectors   ,   ,   , and   . Figure 8 .5 shows projections in Ramses for the estimated instrument rule. The top row shows the result of restrictions on the nominal and real instrument rate for six quarters, quarters 0-5. We see that the phenomenon with a shift to a high inflation projection and low real instrument-rate projection that occurred for restrictions on a positive nominal instrument rate for the Lindé model does not occur for this length of restrictions in Ramses. However, we can see that there is a substantial difference between restrictions on the nominal and the real instrument rate. In the top middle panel we see that the restriction on the real instrument rate to equal unity for quarters 0-5 corresponds to a nominal instrument-projection that starts out negative and then become positive. In the top right panel, we see that a restriction on the nominal instrument-rate 
Conclusions
In describing the optimal policy choice, we have found it practical to describe it as the selection of an optimal policy projection of the instrument rate and the target variables from the set of feasible policy projections, the set of projections of the instrument rate and the target variables that satisfy the projection model of the economy. Thus, the optimal policy projection is the feasible projection that minimizes the intertemporal loss function that represents the objectives of monetary policy.
Although this policy choice is formally equivalent to the choice of an optimal instrument rule, we find the above description of the optimal policy choice closer to the actual choice situation of a monetary-policy committee such as the Riksbank's Executive Board. Riksbank Board members see alternative policy projections to choose from, not alternative optimal instrument rules. Indeed, the optimal instrument rule implicitly takes into account all information that has an impact on the forecast of the target variables, including judgment, which makes it more or less infeasible to write it down.
From this point of view of the optimal policy choice, the set of feasible policy projections has an infinite number of elements. The methods to construct alternative policy projections discussed in this paper can then be seen as aiming to restrict the policy choice to a finite number of relevant alternative policy projections.
From the analysis in this paper, we conclude that, in a model without forward-looking variables, such as the empirical model of the U.S. economy by Rudebusch and Svensson [18] , there is no difference between policy simulations with anticipated and unanticipated restrictions on the instrument-rate path. In a model with forward-looking variables, such as Ramses or the empirical New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy by Lindé [15] , there is such a difference, and the impact of anticipated restrictions would generally be larger than that of unanticipated restrictions. In a model with forward-looking variables, exogenous restrictions on the instrument-rate path are consistent with a unique equilibrium, if there is a switch to a well-behaved policy rule in the future.
For given restrictions on the instrument-rate path, the equilibrium depends on that policy rule.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that, if inflation is sufficiently sensitive to the real instrument rate, "unusual" equilibria may result from restrictions on the nominal instrument rate. Such cases have the property that a shift up of the real interest-rate path reduces inflation and inflationexpectations so much that the nominal interest-rate path (which by the Fisher equation equals the real interest-rate path plus the path of inflation expectations) shifts down. Then, a shift up of the nominal interest-rate path requires an equilibrium where the path of inflation and inflation expectations shifts up more and the real instrument-rate path shifts down. In the RudebuschSvensson model, which has no forward-looking variables, inflation is so sluggish and insensitive to changes in the real instrument rate that there are only small differences between restrictions on the nominal and real instrument rate. In the Lindé model, inflation is so sensitive to the real instrument rate that restrictions for 5-6 quarters or more on the nominal instrument rate results in unusual equilibria. In Ramses, unusual equilibrium seems to require restrictions for 11 quarters or more.
Because of the possibility of unusual equilibria for restrictions on nominal instrument rates, it is preferable to impose restrictions on the real rather than nominal instrument rate, since they lead to more robust and intuitive results. Also, it makes sense to impose restrictions on and consider shifts of the real rather than the nominal instrument-rate path, since the real interest rates rather than the nominal ones are what matter for real activity and for inflation. In general, given the possibility of unusual equilibria, it may in many cases actually be preferable to instead generate alternative instrument-rate projections as optimal policy projections that minimize an intertemporal loss function for alternative weights on the target variables.
Appendix
A. Unanticipated instrument-rule shocks: "Modest interventions" as in Leeper and Zha [14] The method of "modest interventions" of Leeper and Zha [14] can be interpreted as generating central-bank projections that satisfy the restriction on the instrument rate by adding a sequence of additive shocks to the policy rule. These planned shocks are unanticipated by the private sector.
In order to illustrate the Leeper and Zha [14] method of modest interventions, we set  = 0, in which case
and the deviation is a simple zero-mean i.i.d. disturbance. We can then write the projection model as perceived by the private sector as
The solution to this system can be written
for  ≥ 0, where the superscript  denotes that this is the projection believed by the private sector in period .
Let us demonstrate the method of modest interventions only for the restriction (7.1). The central bank plans to satisfy this restriction by a sequence of shocks { + }   =0 that are unanticipated by the private sector. These shocks are chosen such that  satisfies
Then the projection of the current forward-looking variables is given by
For  = 1   , the projection of the predetermined variables is then given by
the shock + is chosen to satisfy
and the projection of the forward-looking variables is given by
There are some conceptual difficulties in a central bank announcing such an instrument-rate path and projection to the private sector. The projection is only relevant if the private sector does not believe that the central bank will actually implement the path but instead follow the instrument rule with zero expected instrument-rule shocks. The method of modest interventions is instead perhaps more appropriate for secret policy simulations and plans that are not announced to the private sector.
B. Projections with an arbitrary time-varying instrument rule
As an alternative method to construct projections with arbitrary time-varying instrument-rate paths, consider projections in period  with an arbitrary time-varying general policy rule, hence including time-varying targeting and instrument rules. A time-varying instrument rule gives considerable flexibility in constructing projections. For instance, when one of the elements of   is unity, which is a practical way to handle non-zero intercepts in the model equations, the instrument rule can be chosen such that all response coefficients are zero except for the coefficient that corresponds to this unitary element of   . Making that coefficient time varying is then a simple way of implementing an arbitrary exogenous path for the nominal or real instrument rate.
More precisely, let (     ) for  ≥ 0 denote the general time-varying policy rule,
are partitioned conformably with   and   , and with   ,   , and   , respectively. In particular, for  ≥  let the policy rule satisfy
That is, from  periods ahead the policy rule is no longer time-varying but constant. Restricting the policy rule rule to be constant beyond some finite horizon is a practical way to ensure determinacy of the projection (the saddlepoint property).
Assume that the constant policy rule (     ) makes the system satisfy the saddlepoint property.
Then we know from the previous section that there exist matrices   and   such that the resulting equilibrium projection satisfies
where we partition  conformably with   and  and observe that 11 
do not depend on  . We then have
where in the latter equation we use (B.2) in the first equality and (B.3) in the second. Equation
Furthermore, we get
Thus, equations (B.5) and (B.6) imply a mapping from
. It is now obvious that equations (B.5) and (B.6) and their analogues for  =  − 2  − 3  0 allow us to recursively construct   and   for  =  − 1  0 such that the equilibrium projection for a time-varying policy rule can be written
For arbitrary (     ) for  = 0 1   , where (     ) apply for  ≥  , there is a possibility that there is a sizeable jump in the projection of the instrument rate and other variables between  =  − 1 and  =  . In many cases alternative instrument-rate paths will be more meaningful and more relevant alternatives if they do not have such discontinuities. This may require some experimentation with the sequence of (     ), the constant future policy rule (     ), and the horizon  . Note again that complete control of the instrument-rate path up to  =  − 1 can be achieved when   = 0, and
has otherwise zero response coefficients except the element of the vector of predetermined variables that is set equal to unity.
B.1. Real instrument rate
We can express any time-varying policy rule (     ) in terms of the real instrument rate by using (7.3) and (7.7) to substitute for   in the policy rule,
We can rewrite this policy rule as as
is partitioned conformably with   and  . This gives us a policy rule in terms of the real instrument rate.
The initial projection (        ) will imply a projection  = { + } ∞  =0 for the real instrument rate, which will satisfy
is the projection for inflation. We can now choose the time-varying policy rule such that, for
For  ≥  , we choose the policy rule to equal the initial policy rule. That is, for  = 0   − 1, this policy rule makes the real instrument rate exogenous and equal to the initial projection of the real instrument rate. In order to express this policy rule in terms of the nominal instrument rate, we can use (7.3) and (7.7) to substitute for  + , which is on the form (B.1).
It should now be clear that the projection for the time-varying policy rule (B.7) will be equal to the initial projection. Hence, we can generate the initial projection with an exogenous path for the real instrument rate. By varying the terms   0 for  = 0 1   − 1, we can then generate projections for alternative exogenous real instrument rate paths.
C. The Rudebusch-Svensson model: An empirical backward-looking model
The two equations of the model of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] are
(C.1)
where   is quarterly inflation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (  ) in percentage points at an annual rate, i.e., 400(ln   − ln  −1 );   is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percentage points at an annual rate;   is the relative gap between actual real GDP (  ) and potential GDP ( *  ) in percentage points, i.e., 100(  −  *  ) *  . These five variables were demeaned prior to estimation, so no constants appear in the equations.
The estimated parameters, using the sample period 1961:1 to 1996:2, are shown in table C.1. The hypothesis that the sum of the lag coefficients of inflation equals one has a -value of .16, so this restriction was imposed in the estimation.
The state-space form can be written ⎡ For simplicity, we set  1 = 1,  2 =  3 =  4 = 0. Then the state-space form can be written 
